Painted by the Lorenzetti brothers in Siena during the early 14th century, this painting symbolises both my attachment to Siena and my commitment to secular values.
Rome has a special place in our hearts because of friends visits, and because of my our shared interest in classics and history.
I have taught and continue to teach undergraduate economics at UCT - what a beautiful university it is.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
witnessing the opposition to legalization of marijuana in California by California Beer and Beverage Distributors. Proposition 19, which proposes the legalization of marijuana in California, has various groups lobbying against it. The main group funding the opposition to the proposition is the California Police Chiefs Association. That makes sense to me for political economy reasons (if I am a policeman, and I know that one of the sources of me having a job is drug crime, if drug possession is no longer a crime, then I am less likely to have a job in the future, therefore I campaign against the legalization of drugs to ensure myself a job), but not moral ones (marijuana doesn't have any 'worse' effects than alcohol, in fact it's less addictive, and legalizing marijuana would decrease certain drug-related crimes, which are often racially/ethnically correlated).
substitute for beer. If the price of a substitute decreases, this implies that the good that has the higher price is going to take a hit to its demand - its demand decreases. Consequently, at the same supply of beer, the price for beer will be lower than it was before the price for the substitute decreased. At this new, lower price, some firms may exit the market because they cannot cover costs. If firms exit the market, then the supply must decrease. If the supply decreases, then there is less beer for beer distributors to distribute, that is, the demand for beer distribution decreases. If the demand for beer distribution decreases, then at a given supply the price for beer distribution must decrease (a new, lower, equilibrium price obtains). At this price some beer distributors may not be able to cover their costs. Some of the distributors will have to exit the market. Consequently, beer distributors will pay now to ensure that a proposition that jeopardises their future profitability does not get passed! Economics in action.
How might this all change if beer and marijuana were complements rather than substitutes? Well, in that case the opposite would hold. Demand for beer would increase with legalization of marijuana (as consumption of marijuana increased, so would consumption of beer). Consequently, there might be an increase in demand for beer distribution, which, at a given supply of beer distribution, would imply a higher price for beer distribution and greater profitability.
So it all rests on whether beer and marijuana are substitutes or complements. It appears as though the beer distributors have a strong reason to believe that they are substitutes, else they wouldn't be paying to try to oppose the legalization of marijuana. I think this is a fantastic, entertaining and easily teachable use of basic economics principles and price theory. I've made a few simplifying assumptions along the way, but the explanation still helps us to understand the behaviour of the beer distributors.
Images sourced from Morguefile.com from users ruskyskytrain and MindExpansi0n.
Monday, September 20, 2010
Stephen Kinsella sends us to a post on economics education by Paul Gregory, author of an Economic Principles text since the 80s, which is now in its seventh edition. Gregory tells us in the post that "There is no need for a new Economics 101. What we have experienced over the past two years is nothing new. There is nothing unexpected that has happened. Events however should serve as “teachable moments." I think that he's right about some stuff, wrong about others and, more problematically, behaves inconsistently in his approach to different theories.
First, I agree that Gregory's post is useful in telling us what is wrong with current policy, that is, that some of the theories that economists in the current US administration have about consumers and firms' preferences and behaviour have been falsified. This is good theory. However, Gregory then takes the behaviour of firms and consumers as confirming evidence of alternative theories. This is a bad theory. You can't apply falsifiability to some theories and then use the data you used to falsify those theories as confirming evidence for theories that you prefer. I could, equivalently, have found falsifying evidence for the theories that he proposes and confirming evidence for the theories that he argues are falsified. This is bad economics and bad philosophy. I'd be differently inclined were he to take a Bayesian position and say that the evidence alters our priors about the theories that we have and that we should adjust our expectations and our probabilities accordingly, but he doesn't. Consequently, I would have been more interested had Gregory said, 'These are Keynesian hypotheses that have been falsified' and 'These are Neoclassical hypotheses that have been falsified.' Then he could have said, 'Here are hypotheses (Neoclassical/Keynesian or otherwise) that have not (yet) been falsified.' I suppose he could have put in his comments about the behaviour of the theories in his text at this juncture, but he should have also looked for falsifying evidence of those theories.
Second, his claim that 'Nothing unexpected has happened' (emphasis on expected, that is in anticipation) is outright rubbish. Many (most) economists did not expect what happened. We can use economic theory to explain it in hindsight, but saying it was expected by those who learned from textbooks such as his is rather outrageous. They (we) did not expect it, did not anticipate it, and subsequently have bungled much of the management of it. In the future we shall be able to use the data from the crisis and the subsequent policy interventions to create a better understanding of extant theories, but the point would be to do so in a methodologically consistent and coherent manner.
Third, and nevertheless, he makes good points about the teaching of moral hazard, uncertainty and information asymmetry. I strongly advocate teaching these ideas in economic principles courses and I suspect that we should give them more weight than ever before. In fact, we should do almost all of our teaching in the understanding that information is almost never perfectly symmetrical, on the contrary it is almost always imperfect. What would this do to our economics principles course if we assumed that imperfect information was the norm and not the exception. Well, I would argue that, in opposition to Gregory, we would need a new Economics 101 and that, consequently, we could coherently take the past few years a 'teachable moment' in the understanding that economists themselves are victims of imperfect information and are not exempt from their own theories.
Saturday, September 11, 2010
On Thursday I gave a presentation at the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town about incorporating pop culture and better use of technology into your teaching. I've been trying to experiment with various things in my teaching recently and I plan to experiment more in the future.
The talk began with a discussion of whether I think we should use slides or not. I think we can (not necessarily should) use slides, but that they need to be of a very high quality and that they need to be designed with specific goals in mind. For this, I discussed people like Edward Tufte, Garr Reynolds, Larry Lessig and I used Hans Rosling as someone who uses both analog and digital presentation props well, and from whom I think we can learn as instructors of economics. I proceeded to discuss some useful databases that are out there and to which people can contribute: Movies for Econ and Music for Econ. An example: I recently took it upon myself to use music videos in my lecture slides and tutorials and based questions and examples on these music videos (you'll see two of them in the presentation). I moved on to look at various resources that are out there, both proprietary software that I use (Screenflow in Mac OS) and internet repositories for creative commons or shared products, e.g. compfight.com for CC images, or Teaching Resources for Undergraduate Economics (TRUE) for economics.
I also began to broach the topic of the challenges that I've faced in trying to innovate. For example, the costs of bandwidth in South Africa force the university to adopt a 'Campus Internet Quota' (CIQ). Because of the CIQ, students on campus are allowed approximately 200MB per month of external internet access. Consequently, after I had uploaded my videos to Vimeo I was contacted by students staying in campus residences who said that they could not access the videos because they were too big and they'd exceeded their CIQs (the videos range from 80-120MB depending on the content). This resulted in me having to work out work-arounds. It was an education.
I concluded the discussion by bringing up 'open content' generally and the University of Cape Town's own attempts to move toward open content. There are many examples of researchers and teachers trying to open up teaching and research: academicearth.org, MIT open courseware, etc. I hope I can contribute in my small way as I go forward.
There are all kinds of things I didn't get around to discussing: blogs, twitter, using an RSS feed (which is still a foreign concept for some), prezi. I hope to write something more official on this topic using my experiences as a case study and I hope that I can make some more general points in the article. We'll see what comes of it.
The presentation was received well by the members of the audience. Many of the staff had not seen me present before or thought about this stuff became readily engaged and hope to look at a lot of this stuff in the future. The problems are, obviously, the large fixed costs of getting to know the resources out there and the incentive problems that an academic faces when choosing whether to dedicate time to research or to teaching (with its attendant preparation). I hoped to convince them that the spillovers, once you've incurred the initial high fixed costs, are valuable and will improve your presenting as you go forward in your career. We've yet to see whether I'll be a case in support of this argument or not.
h/t Stephen Kinsella for getting me to think more deeply about these topics and suggesting readings that got me onto this whole push for improved teaching and use of technology (or abandoning slideware entirely).
h/t Lara Skelly who is the economics librarian at UCT. She's done (and is doing) all kinds of good work and updating me on information and additional resources for open content, creative commons in teaching, and more.
Sunday, September 05, 2010
Jonah Lehrer recently wrote about the identifiable victim effect. In the piece he talks about the work of Paul Slovic and identifiable victims. I appreciate the work that Slovic has done. I have met and interacted with some of Slovic's co-authors and think the work is great. The idea behind identifiable victim bias is that people respond differently when they see one 'identifiable' victim rather than a bunch of statistics indicating the 'true' depths of poverty. For example, people give £3.50 in the one case and less than half that in the other. Lehrer says the following about the different reactions that people have:
"Of course, this is a deeply irrational reaction. We are much less interested in helping a victim – we only want to help the victim. (This bias is known as the identifiable victim effect, since it suggests that we react much more strongly when the victim can be specified.) Why do we this? Because human charity is ultimately rooted in our compassionate feelings, and not in some rational, utilitarian calculations. We are not Vulcans."But, Lehrer's claim that it's 'irrational' for us to respond in one way to an emotive stimulus and another to an intellectual one is false. Again, this abuses the idea of 'rationality'. What Lehrer is actually saying is that people behave in a way that he interprets as inconsistent, and thus irrational. I would argue, instead, that the behaviour is not inconsistent. That is, in an agent's preference rankings they will (or may, depending on the agent) consistently prefer - and rank higher - cases in which they can identify victims rather than observe the statistics of a problem. This can be a consistent response. It just seems as though Lehrer wants to project a certain kind of value on what an individual's ranking should be and, because he thinks its inconsistent, infer it is irrational. Were it inconsistent for all agents at all times, it would display irrational behaviour.
He then goes on to examine a new paper in which some people are 'less irrational' than others. That is, some people who tend to be 'more analytical' also tend not to 'fall victim to' the identifiable victim bias. OK, we're getting somewhere. What this says to me, instead, is that people who value analysis are going to approach and rank their preferences in such a way that they would like their emotional and analytical selves to be consistent. That is their preference rankings mirror the correlate of tendency to analyse. What Lehrer does not say is that both groups could be rational and satisfying preference functions that are indeed consistent, but that he does not know what those preference sets are. If we accepted this, and measured at the level of the population, we might be able to infer what those preference sets are from the behaviours that people display, rather than labelling one group as rational and the other as not.
The problem here is one of identification. That is, can we identify at the level of the individual ex ante and without additional information what a given individual will rank higher? No, we can't. We need their preferences to be revealed by their behaviour. OK. Once we have data, though, might we be able to list the probabilities with which an individual's preferences might fall into one class or another? Yes. In fact, I'd say that would be progress. Admitting the possibility of agents with heterogeneous preference sets, that is, people who rank things differently, and therefore rank their responses to things like statistics and identifiable victims differently, is a step toward improving the behavioural sciences. The point is the idea of rationality is non-tautologous as long as we have accurate descriptions of the classes of preferences that individuals might have. If I understand the problem accurately, then this is indeed what many researchers are trying to consider when it comes to other-regarding and self-regarding preferences. Some agents seem to display other-regarding preferences. Other agents seem to display self-regarding preferences. Given no knowledge about an individual we cannot say with certainty which kind of preferences they have. But, as more data mounts, we should be able to say that individuals with certain kinds of characteristics are more likely to display a certain set of preferences given a certain set of conditions. We could then provide probabilities with which a given individual about whom we have limited information will display one set of preferences or another. Rationally. Similarly, once we have better and more comprehensive data about how states affect behaviour, then we can improve our understanding of state-based and endogenous preferences (see Bowles's (2006) book Microeconomics: Institutions, Behavior and Evolution for a decent summary of these ideas).
To me, that is more interesting than identifiable victim bias being 'irrational'. I must also leave this post with a caveat: I do not believe people are fully rational. Moreover, I feel studying psychology can improve our understanding of agents in the settings that they are accustomed to and to understanding proximate motives for behaviour (see Greg Mankiw's NYT column from today where he urges students to study psych, along with one or two other subjects). But I also think that inaccurate commentary on what rationality is and means does not help us to improve the behavioural sciences. Moreover, I think a proper understanding of rationality and its applications in the behavioural sciences serves to improve them rather than impoverish them (consistent, for example, with this recent post at Crooked Timber).
Friday, August 27, 2010
an article in which it was shown that fashion houses also send out their opponents’ products to sub-lebrities, that is, those people at the lower end of the celebrity spectrum with whom the fashion houses would rather not have their products associated in case it jeopardises their brand. You get your opponents' customers to see that some loser sub-lebrity has their branded goods, which makes those customers come and buy your goods instead. Eureka!
What do they need to do to get out of this situation? As someone who doesn't consume these goods, I don't really care, but the consumers of the goods should because the costs are probably going to be passed on to them (depending on the elasticity of demand for these goods, which might be quite great given that they are luxury goods). Anyway, I suspect that they would like to alter the game so that the incentive to anti-brand is removed. I suspect, though, that now all firms have done it, there is no credible way to get rid of it. All the firms will continue to do it, in the interests of attempting to get more market share, but ultimately damaging their profitability because if everyone does it, no single firm is likely to improve their market share. Doh! Did no one at Gucci or Prada study game theory? What's probably even more frustrating for a consumer of these goods is that the outcome is not like the breakdown of cooperation in a cartel in which consumers might eventually benefit from lower prices, here, instead, consumers may suffer. Poor fashionistas! Your Prada, Gucci and other famous brand's will cost more now.
Images: Gucci Bag from guccigoods.com, Snooki trio from americanchic.net
Monday, August 09, 2010
I've just read this review - by John Gray - of Matt Ridley's book The Rational Optimist. I originally intended to comment on the article's content, then realised that I had to refer to some commenters who would probably just troll (because, I suspect, their ignorance displays their misunderstanding of the position that they advocate). Anyway, here's the extended version of the comment I planned to write. My comment is intended to be about the comments and not so much about the review itself.
I get the sense when reading the comments on Gray's review that people are misconstruing as a philosophical point what Gray intended instead as a description of an historic process, i.e. when Gray says "Laissez faire [...] was imposed through state power". What Gray seems to be saying is that what we mean when we talk about 'laissez faire' occurred not only as a consequence of decentralized decision-making by people, but also because of the application of state power to reinforce and support (an approximation of) laissez faire. In terms of British, Dutch and US history that makes sense: these countries had people who made decentralized decisions to create and sustain free markets, and then used state power to mobilize the populace to protect these free markets. So-called laissez faire was not only the result of a decentralized process, but also a consequence of people coming together and asserting the primacy of free markets through state power and democratic systems.
Also, semantically, laissez faire is not the 'absence of state power' as some commenters assert. It is the absence of state intervention in industry and the market particularly, rather than the absence of any government intervention or state power generally. The absence of state power is anarchism, not laissez-faire. Consequently, it's entirely consistent for state power to support laissez faire market organizations by using state power to prevent state intervention in markets. This is what Gray said. Moreover, state power is often necessary to ensure that markets remain free. Adam Smith made this point in The Wealth of Nations when he observed that "People of the same trade seldom meet together [...] but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public." (WoN, Book1, Ch 10) Smith argued later in The Wealth of Nations that government would be required to sustain competitive markets against the forces of merchants operating in the market. Consequently, it is only through the exercise of state power that free markets, that is laissez faire, can be protected and sustained. Anarcho-capitalism is a pipe dream.
Some other commenters also seem to suggest that the kind of capitalism used by China is equivalent to a 'free market'. I suggest that they read their Hayek on the differences between private property (several property) and state property and what sustains liberty in markets (see, for example, The Fatal Conceit). The point is not that China was a Communist country, but that China now engages in a form of state-sponsored capitalism (also, anyone who claims that the Chinese economy is a free market obviously forgets that the Renminbi is not a floating exchange rate - they need to read their Friedman). Ridley apparently ignores China as a counter-example. It appears he also ignores other east Asian State-Owned Enterprises and their roles in these quasi-capitalism economies. It's the problem that 21st century capitalism may not only be about private property, but about state property and how states dispose of their property in ways that might contravene principles of liberty, yet their policies result in improved material flourishing of their populations. It's a problem for those, such as myself and Ridley, who advocate a capitalism based on private property. We need to examine and confront this problem, not ignore the problem as Ridley apparently does.
Independent of these problems in the comments and the massive problems and glossings-over in Ridley's book, Gray gets several things wrong too. It would take him some time to cover all of them, so I will try to cover one: it appears as though Gray has not read any of the literature on cultural evolution and group selection, often in counterpoint to and contention with gene-level-only selection arguments. Consider, for example, the work of Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, or that of Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza. Gray incorrectly labels cultural evolution a 'misleading metaphor'. He portrays his ignorance of the topic by saying so - it's not only about memes and Susan Blackmore. Gray is right to call Ridley on Ridley's poor history, Ridley's mis-characterization of cultural evolution as an ultimately teleological force with laissez faire capitalism as its end, and Ridley's attempts to ignore confounding facts like China. But Gray should have been more careful in his representation of evolutionary theory as he ignored important ideas in contemporary theory that approach the problems in a theoretically well-grounded manner.
Thursday, August 05, 2010
I am slowly uploading my lectures from Cooperation and Competition (EC2007S) at the University of Cape Town to
Cooperation and Competition - 1st Lecture 26 July 2010 from Simon Halliday on Vimeo.
">vimeo, a good video sharing site. You can see the "channel" for the videos here: Cooperation and Competition. You can subscribe to the RSS feed of the channel if you're interested. Cooperation and Competition is a course in introductory game theory using the textbook Games of Strategy by Dixit, Skeath and Reiley (which I mentioned recently in this post). The videos are a combination of a video of me and a screencast - that is a video and audio capture of the slides that I use for my lectures. The book is great because it covers all the basics of game theory with many good intuitions. I try to make the content even more intuitive and accessible in my lectures, brushing over a bit of stuff initially though defining it more clearly later. I only lecture six weeks of the course, going quite in depth into the ideas and applications of strategic form games, games with many players and extensive form games.
I have embedded the first lecture below. I was quite fortunate to have Helen Zille and Patricia De Lille declare an agreement to cooperate the day before the course started, which meant that I could use that as a starting point for a discussion of agents agreeing to cooperate in political games. This meant that students could see from the get-go that game theory offers all kinds of interesting insights into various aspects of interactions outside of its immediate purview, that is outside of economics (I'd rather not be accused of 'economics imperialism' here, the idea is for students to see that there are many applications of game theory and then later to develop a more nuanced view of the limits and extensions to the theory once they have a better understanding).
Cooperation and Competition - 1st Lecture 26 July 2010 from Simon Halliday on Vimeo.